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FOREWORD: LESSONS FROM THE SADDAM TRIAL

Michael P. Schmf
I. INTRODUCTION

The emerging system of international criminal justice is composed
of a spectrum of institutions, from purely international courts (such as the
International Criminal Court and the ad hoc international criminal tribunals
for Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia) to hybrid international-domestic
tribunals (such as the ad hoc Court for East Timor, the Special Court for
Sierra Leone, and the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia)
to purely domestic courts and war crimes commissions. A recent addition to
that list that falls somewhere between hybrid tribunals and domestic courts
is the so-called "internationalized domestic tribunal," exemplified by the
Bosnian War _Crimes Chamber in Sarajevo and the Iraqi High Tribunal
(IHT) in Baghdad.
The IHT merits characterization as an internationalized domestic
tribunal because its statute and rules of procedure are modeled on the U.N.
war crimes tribunals for the former Yugoslavia, Rwanda, and Sierra Leone,
and its statute provides that the IHT is to be guided by the precedent of the
U.N. tribunals and that its judges and prosecutors are to be assisted by international experts. 1 But the IHT is not fully international or even international
enough to be dubbed a hybrid court, since it is seated in Baghdad, its prosecutor is Iraqi, it uses the Iraqi Criminal Code to supplement the provisions
of its statute and rules, and its bench is composed exclusively of Iraqi
judges.
Internationalized domestic tribunals are seen as a potentially vital
supplement to the International Criminal Court, which lacks the resources
Michael Scharf is Professor of Law and Director of the Frederick K. Cox International
Law Center at Case Western Reserve University School of Law. From 2004 to 2005, he was
part of the international team assembled by the International Bar Association that provided
training to the judges of the Iraqi High Tribunal. In 2006, Prof. Scharf led the first training
session for the judges and prosecutors of the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia. Prof. Scharf is the co-author of Saddam on Trial: Understanding and Debating the
Iraqi High Tribunal (Carolina Academic Press, 2006), available at http://www.cappress.com/books/1625.
1
The English translation of the IHT Statute is available at http://law.case.edu/
grotian-moment-blog/documents/IST_statute_official_english. pdf. The English translation of
the IHT Rules of Procedure and Evidence is available at http://law.case.edu/
grotian-moment-blog/documents/IST_rules_procedure_evidence.pdf.
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and personnel to prosecute all but a tiny portion of cases in situations where
the domestic system is unable or unwilling to do so. As one of the first internationalized domestic tribunals, the perceived success or failure of the
IHT is likely to have an affect on the future use of that model of international justice.
Unfortunately, the IHT was snake-bitten from its conception. Many
countries, international organizations, and human rights NGOs opposed the
IHT from the start because it followed an invasion that they believed to be
unlawful, provided for the death penalty, and was seen as preventing deployment of a truly international court. And then, once the Dujail trial began, the proceedings were marred by the assassination of three defense
counsel, the resignation of the presiding judge, the boycott of the defense
team, the disruptive conduct of the defendants, and finally by an execution
that everyone agrees was an utter fiasco. In light of all that went awry, attempting to provide an objective appraisal of the IHT is a bit like assessing
the tragic evening of April 14, 1865 by inquiring, "Well, other than that,
Mrs. Lincoln, how did you enjoy the show?"
But an objective assessment of the IHT would have to acknowledge
that there were in fact some positive aspects as well. For example, the IHT
Statute and Rules represent a novel attempt to blend international standards
of due process with Middle Eastern legal traditions. It is particularly noteworthy that the Dujail trial was the first-ever televised criminal proceeding
in the Middle East, enabling millions of people throughout the region to see
the process of justice unfold, warts and all. While the judges of the IHT
might not have followed every provision of the tribunal's internationallyinspired Statute and Rules as scrupulously as they should have, the judges
bent over backward to grant Saddam Hussein the right to personally crossexamine his accusers and make statements to the bench-an opportunity he
took advantage of thirty-nine times during the trial. And while the media
reported that the court-appointed public defenders who represented the defendants while their retained lawyers boycotted most of the trial were not up
to the task, in fact they were ably assisted by a distingo_ished British judge
who had previously served as defense counsel in cases before .the Yugoslavia and Rwanda tribunals. The four-hour closing argument delivered by the
public defenders was particularly impressive and ultimately led to the acquittal of one of the seven Dujail defendants and relatively light sentences
for three others.
Most importantly, the 298-page, single-spaced opinion of the Trial
Chamber,2 which was issued on November 22, 2006, meticulously de2
An English translation of the Iraqi High Tribunal's Dujail Trial Opinion and the Appeals Chamber Opinion are available in the appendix of this journal. 39 CASE W. REs. J.
INT'L L., apps. A, B (2007).
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scribed the court's findings of fact and conclusions of law, with numerous
citations to the past decisions of international tribunals. To assist the judges
in preparing their opinion, the U.S. Embassy's Regime Crimes Liaison Office provided translations of the major war crimes judgments of our time,
from Nuremberg to The Hague-the first time this body of jurisprudence
has ever been made available in Arabic.
The trial chamber's opinion-the first fifty-four pages of which are
devoted to responding to the numerous motions and arguments of the defense counsel-addresses many of the objections of the tribunal's critics.
For example, the opinion convincingly explains why recusal of the presiding judge was not warranted. While the defense team bas publicly complained that it did not have access to all of the evidence in a timely manner,
the opinion documents that both the defense and prosecution were provided
the entire dossier prepared by the investigative judge, containing all of the
evidence the judges considered in arriving at their verdict, three months
before the trial commenced.
The opinion also explains that the assassinations of the three defense counsel could have been prevented if the three bad accepted the security measures that protected the judges, witnesses, prosecutors, and the rest
of the one hundred-member defense team. And throughout, the opinion applies the "beyond reasonable doubt" standard, which should mollify critics
who had complained that this standard was not explicitly provided for in the
IHT Statute or Rules.
Two points stand out in the Dujail Trial Chamber opinion for establishing noteworthy legal precedent. First, Saddam's main defense was that
as a leader, he was entitled to take action against a town that had tried to
assassinate him and was populated by insurgents and terrorists allied with
Iran at a time when Iraq and Iran were at war. The opinion details why the
actions taken against the town of Dujail and its inhabitants "was not necessary to stop an immediate and imminent danger" and how the actions were
disproportionate to the threat. In this way, the opinion makes clear that there
is a line to be drawn in every country's fight against terrorism and that Saddam Hussein and his co-defendants crossed that line. Second, it is significant that the opinion begins with the case against Awad al-Bandar, the
president of Saddam's Revolutionary Court, who was charged with using
his court as a weapon by conducting an "illusionary trial" and then ordering
the execution of 148 villagers of Dujail, including several individuals who
were under eighteen years of age. Ironically, al-Bandar was convicted of
doing the very thing critics have accused the IHT of doing: presiding over a
trial devoid of due process of law. But the many details of the case against
Al-Bandar contained in the Dujail Trial Chamber opinion make it clear how
fundamentally different the IHT is from Saddam Hussein's Revolutionary
Courts. In any event, the legal analysis of the case against al-Bandar will
serve as an important warning to judges in Iraq and elsewhere that they, too,
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may face prosecution if they stray from the internationally recognized fair
trial requirements.
These may seem like modest accomplishments in light of all that
went wrong during the Dujail trial, but in assessing the lliT, one must recognize that there were no other feasible alternatives for bringing Saddam
Hussein to justice after his capture in 2003. While many of us would have
preferred an international venue, that option was not on the table in 2003 for
a variety of reasons. The newly-established International Criminal Court
was not available for the trial of Saddam Hussein because of the "nonretroactivity" clause in its Statute, prohibiting the court from trying cases
that arose before June 2002. A Security Council-created ad hoc tribunal was
not a possibility because France, Russia, and China let it be known that they
would veto any effort to establish such a tribunal for Iraq since they felt the
U.S. invasion had been unlawful. Simply turning Saddam Hussein over to
the ordinary Iraqi courts, on the other hand, was not seen as a viable option
either, since the Iraqi judiciary had been left in shambles after three decades
ofBa'athist rule.
Some have suggested that the success of the lliT should be judged
by how well it has contributed to peace and the transition to democracy in
Iraq. Admittedly, in the short term, the tribunal has not proven to be an effective mechanism for reconciliation. In fact the month following Saddam
Hussein's execution has been the bloodiest since the invasion in 2003. But
history suggests that that is not a fair benchmark for judging a war crimes
tribunal. Indeed, recently declassified opinion polls which were conducted
by the U.S. Department of State from 1946 through 1958 indicated that over
eighty percent of the West German people did not believe the findings of
the Nuremberg tribunal and considered the Nuremberg proceedings to be
nothing but "acts of political retribution without fmn legal basis." By 1953,
the State Department had concluded that the Nuremberg Trials had completely failed to "reeducate" West Germans. 3
Similarly, Security Council Resolution S27, which established the
Yugoslavia tribunal, stated that war crimes prosecutions wou,ld contribute to
the restoration of peace in the region. However, during Milosevic's fouryear trial (2002-2006), rather than being discredited the former Serb
leader's popularity soared. Polls conducted during the trial indicated that
seventy-five percent of Serbs believed Milosevic was not receiving a fair
trial, and sixty-six percent did not believe that he was responsible for war
crimes. At mid-trial, campaigning from the courtroom in The Hague, Milosevic won a seat in the Serb Parliament in a landslide election.4 The lesson
3

PETER MAGUIRE, LAW AND WAR: AN AMERICAN STORY 241,246 (2000).
Andre Purvis, Star Power in Serbia: Slobodan Milosevic 's Performance at his War
Crimes Trial has Won Him Increased Popularity at Home, TIME, Sept. 30, 2002, at 46; Gary
J. Bass, Milosevic in the Hague, FOREIGN AFF., May/June 2003, at 82.
4
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from the Nuremberg and Yugoslavia tribunals is that war crimes trials have
always been and are likely always to be divisive, at least in the short term.
No matter the strength of the evidence that is presented in the courtroom,
and no matter how many people watch the proceedings, those that support ·
the defendants will continue to support them and perceive the proceedings
as unfair.
Others have suggested that the lliT should be judged harshly because its first trial was one of the messiest in legal history. Major war
crimes trials are inherently messy. War crimes defendants and their lawyers
seldom play by the court's rules, desiring instead to transform the proceedings into political theatre. None of the major war crimes trials to _date have
been praised as a model of fairness, efficiency, or decorum. Indeed, at the
conclusion of the Nuremberg trial, Chief Justice Harlan Fiske Stone publicly castigated the Nuremberg proceedings "as a high grade lynching
party."5 In a speech to Congress that was subsequently reproduced with
admiration in John F. Kennedy's Pulitzer Prize-winning book, Profiles of
Courage, Senator Robert Taft of Ohio harshly criticized every aspect of the
Nuremberg project. 6
Fifty-five years later, the Slobodan Milosevic trial before the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia was similarly subject
to widespread criticism, including suspicions surrounding the timing of the
indictment (in the middle of the NATO bombing campaign), the manner of
Milosevic's surrender (in violation of a judicial order by the Serb Supreme
Court), the tribunal's decision to allow the defendant to represent himself
(enabling him to disrupt and hijack the proceedings), the judges demeanor
(the presiding judge often yelled at the defendant), the replacement of the
presiding judge who had fallen ill with a judge who had not been present for
the first two years of the proceedings, and the fact that the defendant himself died before the conclusion of the trial. 7
It is often said that just as courts try cases, so too do cases try
courts. As the first trial before the Iraqi High Tribunal, the Dujail case was
the test-run for this novel judicial institution. Clearly it bad a bumpy start,
but judged in light of the unique challenges that the lliT faced, the fact that
there were no feasible alternatives available for trying Saddam Hussein, and
that war crimes trials are historically ·divisive and messy, the IHT cannot
simply be written off as an utter failure.

5

GARY JONATHAN BASS, STAY THE HAND OF VENGEANCE: PoLmcs OF WAR CRIMES
TRIBUNALS 25 (2000).
6
JOHN F. KENNEDY, PROFTI.ES IN COURAGE 231-44 (1964).
7
See Michael P. Scharf, The Legacy of the Milosevic Trial, in BRINGING POWER TO
JUSTICE 25,25-46 (Joanna Harrington, Michael Mi1de, & Richard Verdonn, eds.) (2006).
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II. "LESSONS FROM THE SADDAM TRIAL"
After the Nuremberg trial sixty years ago, Chief Prosecutor Robert
Jackson reported to President Truman that despite the many errors and missteps that occurred during the proceedings, he was consoled by the fact that
the lessons from the wwn war crimes tribunal would be instructive for the
future. 8 In this spirit, on October 6-7, 2006, the Frederick K. Cox Center at
Case Western Reserve University School of Law hosted an international
conference and experts meeting entitled "Lessons from the Saddam Trial."
The October 2006 Saddam trial conference was organized by a program committee consisting of Professor Michael Newton of Vanderbilt
University; Professor William Schabas, Director of the Irish Centre for Human Rights at the National University of Ireland in Galway; Mark Ellis,
Executive Director of the International Bar Association headquartered in
London, and myself. The conference was co-sponsored by the International
Bar Association and the Irish Centre for Human Rights and was designated
a Centennial Regional Meeting of the American Society of International
Law, a Regional Conference of the International Law Association (American Branch), and the Annual Meeting of the International Association of
Penal Law (American National Section).
The October 2006 Saddam trial conference included a keynote address and six panels: (1) "Preparing for the Mother of All Trials", (2) "Order in the Courtroom: The Challenges of Trying a Tyrant", (3) "Debate: Did
Saddam Get a Fair Trial?", (4) "Saddam on Stage: Assessing the Media
Coverage of the Trial", (5) "Lessons Learned from the Dujail Trial: A
Cross-Fire Panel", and (6) "Was the Dujail Trial One of the Trials of the
Century?" In addition to a number of leading academics, the two dozen expert participants included the ar:pbassador of Iraq to the United States, the
executive director of Human Rights Watch, CNN International and Court
TV Saddam Trial expert commentators, the former Director of the Regime
Crimes Liaison Office, a fair trial observer who sat through the Dujail tlial
in Baghdad, the deputy director of the State Department Office for War
Crimes Issues, the former chief prosecutor of the Special Court for Sierra
Leone, the senior legal advisor to the Chambers of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, the former principal public defender of the Special
Court for Sierra Leone, and the former chair of the Drafting Committee for
the International Criminal Court.
This special double issue of the Case Western Reserve Journal of
International Law contains eight articles generated from the October 2006
Saddam trial conference, which makes a significant contribution to the lit8
ROBERT H. JACKSON, REPORT TO THE PRESrDENT (October 7, 1946), quoted in MICHAEL
P. SCHARF, BALKAN JUSTICE: THE STORY BEHIND THE FIRST INTERNATIONAL WAR CRIMES
TRIAL SINCE NUREMBERG, at 3 (1997).
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erature on war crimes tribunals. It also contains transcripts of the debate on
whether Saddam Hussein received a fair trial and the "cross-fire" panel discussion of the lessons learned from the Dujail trial. In addition, we have
included, as an appendix to the double-issue, the English translations of the
Dujail Trial Chamber Opinion and Appeals Chamber Opinion.
Although the views ofthe individuals who participated in the October Saddam trial conference diverged on many points, they all agreed that
much can be learned from the way the Dujail trial unfolded, and that these
lessons can help improve the way the Iraqi High Tribunal tackles its upcoming trials, as well as the way the international community can help domestic
prosecutions of former leaders accused of atrocities in other parts of the
world. To that end, the day following the conference many of the experts
participated in a day-long experts meeting, which resulted in a document
titled "Ten Lessons from the Saddam Trial" (appended below). While not
specifically endorsed by the participants, this document reflects the general
points of consensus that emerged from the meeting.
I am extremely grateful to my program committee colleagues for
their help in organizing this ambitious project, and to our distinguished panelists for their participation in the "Lessons from the Saddam Trial" conference and contributing to this symposium issue of the Case Western Reserve
Journal of International Law. My appreciation also goes out to the student
editors of this volume who worked diligently on the preparation of this publication.
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APPENDIX
TEN LESSONS FROM THE SAD DAM TRIAL

Generated from the October 7, 2006 Cleveland Experts Meeting
Chaired by Michael Scharf
Co-Rapporteurs: Gregory McNeal, Christopher Rassi, &
Brianne Draffin

Lesson # 1: There should be a presumption ~gainst undertaking domestic war crimes trials in countries languishing in a conflict environment.
The International Criminal Court's "complementarity regime" reflects international recognition that domestic trials have advantages over
international trials and are to be preferred unless the national courts are unable or unwilling to prosecute. At the same time, it must be recognized that
in the best of circumstances, undertaking international war crimes trials is
arduous; in a country plagued by sectarian violence and devoid of reliable
security mechanisms, the premature launching of such a trial can be reckless
and potentially futile. It also runs the risk of negating the potential benefits
to the broader criminallayv system. In such circumstances, a more responsible and viable option may have been to utilize a neutral jurisdiction, preferably in the relevant region. In the current lliT trials, extreme and immediate steps must be taken to guarantee the protection of defense counsel, as
well as the judges, prosecutors, and witnesses-whether they desire such
protection or not.
Lesson #2: Post-conflict countries that undertake domestic war crimes
trials need unbiased international assistance.
Referring to the Iraqi High Tribunal as a domestic court is a misnomer. Behind the scenes, the United States played a crucial role in drafting
the tribunal's Statute, collecting evidence to be used by the prosecution, and
providing both security and fmancing to the tribunal. Although the United
States, as an occupying force, should not have been the one to unilaterally
play this role, international assistance for a domestic war crimes tribunal
following the fall of an authoritarian regime is indispensable. In the future,
transitional justice should be a key goal that attracts legal and administrative
support from across the international spectrum. Serious consideration
should be given to foregoing the death penalty as the price for obtaining
international support and involvement. The international community should
provide substantial training in international criminal law to jurists, including
defense attorneys, serving on domestic war crimes tribunals. An international perspective on substantive and procedural law concerning crimes of
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genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity is essential, and international best practices serve to supplement established domestic norms to provide an integrated model.

Lesson #3: Steps should be taken to further internationalize the Iraqi
High Tribunal.
Like the Statute of the War Crimes Chamber of the Court of Bosnia
and Herzegovina, Article 3(5) of the IHT Statute provides for the appointment of one or more foreign judges to join the Iraqi judges on the bench, but
without explanation none were ever appointed. Such an appointment of a
distinguished Arabic-speaking judge from the region would greatly promote
the perception of the IHT as a fair and competent judicial institution, without sacrificing the essential Iraqi character of the tribunal. In addition, the
Statute provides for the appointment of international advisers to assist the
judges, prosecutor, and defense team. To date, the identities of the non-U.S.
advisers working with the tribunal have been kept confidential for their protection, but this has led to the misperception thatthe only foreign advisers
are members of the U.S. Department of Justice Regime Crimes Liaison Office, which in turn makes the tribunal appear to be an American-controlled
enterprise. In future trials, more advisors selected by respected NGOs such
as the International Bar Association should be recruited to assist the tribunal, and their contribution (if not their identities) needs to be made public.

Lesson #4: Steps should be taken to strengthen the independence of the
Iraqi High Tribunal.
An independent and impartial court is a fundamental prerequisite
for meeting international standards of fairness in a trial. Any appearance of
government influence is a damning indictment of a court's independence.
During the Saddam trial, there were several instances in which the government made inappropriate comments and attempted to interfere with the proceedings. Article 4(4) of the IHT Statute, which provides that the Iraqi
Presidency Council may transfer judges from the IHT to the Higher Judicial
Council for any reason, should be amended. Judges should only be removable for cause and only through a decision of the other IHT judges, not the
unfettered whim of the executive branch. In addition, Article 33, which provides that no person who was a member of the Ba' ath party shall serve as a
judge or other officer of the IHT, should be revised to make clear that removal of judges on grounds of former Ba'ath party membership shall occur
only via the IHT's internal fact finding and disciplinary procedures.

Lesson #5: Domestic war crimes trials should be kept short and focused.
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Domestic war crimes courts should be judicious in deciding the
charges brought against a defendant and in deciding the best sequence of
cases. The court must be very conscious of the balance between lengthy
delays needed to adequately prepare for trial and the rights of potential defendants held for extended periods pending trial. The legal predisposition to
charge all the crimes attributable to an individual in one conglomerated case
can lead to excessively lengthy trials, while the practice of charging specific
situations will generally necessitate repetitive trials of senior officials. In
any event, the length of trial will be a critical factor in the public perceptions of the process. The lliT was correct in selecting, as its first case
against Saddam Hussein, a relatively straightforward incident of criminality.
The Dujail case was manageable and the documentary evidence was remarkably strong, enabling the tribunal to narrow its focus. On the other
hand, Saddam Hussein's execution after the Dujail verdict deprived victims
of seeing him stand trial on other much more serious charges.

Lesson #6: Pre-trial motions need to be resolved as they arise.
Consistent with Iraqi and international law, Saddam's defense
counsel filed a series of motions addressing issues such as the impartiality
of the judges and access to witnesses and documents. One of the most glaring shortcomings of the tribunal was its failure to articulate a response to
these motions until the final trial chamber opinion was issued at the end of
the Dujail trial. The court's silence significantly weakened its transparency
and undermined the credibility of the judicial process. In future trials, the
lliT should make it a practice to issue written opinions addressing such
issues as they arise, consistent with the normal practice of Iraqi courts and
the international war crimes tribunals. In addition, the IHT should maintain
a regularly updated list of all motions filed and all scheduling decisions.

Lesson #7: Domestic war crimes tribunals must utilize accepted tactics
to maintain control of the courtroom without trammeling on the rights
of the defense.
Trying former leaders is always a messy affair, especially when a
decision has been made to televise the proceedings gavel-to-gavel, and the
defendants have indicated an intention to disrupt the trial, distract public
attention from the evidence against them, and turn the televised trial into a
political stage. To ensure decorum and protect the integrity of the process,
the judges in a domestic war crimes trial should be prepared to take a number of steps, which have been undertaken successfully by other tribunals.
First, standby counsel should be appointed at the start of the trial.
They should be trained and assisted by international advisors. At the start of
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the trial, the judges should explain the purpose of standby counsel, release
general information about their qualifications and experience, and describe
the conditions in which they will be asked to take over for retained defense
counsel. The Yugoslavia and Rwanda tribunals and the Special Court for
the Sierra Leone successfully employed standby counsel. The very existence of such standby public defenders may deter misconduct by the defense, since the defense lawyers know they can be replaced, if necessary, at
a moment's notice. In addition, if misconduct persists after due warning, the
tribunal should not hesitate to hold retained counsel in contempt of court
and subject them to appropriate disciplinary sanctions for conduct that
would merit such action in an ordinary court. In such cases, the presiding
judge needs to dispassionately explain in open court why the steps taken
were warranted.
Second, defendants must be warned that they will lose their right of
self-representation (or in the Iraqi context, their right to ask follow-up questions after their lawyers are finished questioning a witness) and may face
expulsion or other sanctions if they act disruptively or inappropriately in the
courtroom. Persistent disruption after such a warning should result in temporary exclusion, followed by a calibrated response proportionate to the
degree and persistence of disruption. If the defendant is expelled from the
courtroom, he must be permitted to follow the courtroom proceedings and
be able to speak with counsel remotely via communications link.
Lesson #8: The IHT's appeals process must be sufficiently deliberative.

The timing and substance of the Appeals Chamber decision was one
of the most controversial aspects of the Dujail trial. The lliT should maintain a verbatim written transcript of court proceedings, which should be
made available to the prosecution and defense in a timely manner so that
they can prepare an appeal. Sufficient time must be allocated to all parties to
raise specific allegations of factual or legal error. The Appeals Chamber
decision must sufficiently address each legal and factual issue raised in a
detailed manner. The time required to compose the Appeals Chamber decision should be sufficient to prepare the opinion and must not be driven by
external political or emotional factors unrelated to the facts of the case.
Lesson #9: Domestic war crimes tribunals must make gender justice a
priority.

Domestic war crimes tribunals should ensure fair representation of
women judges, prosecutors, and other staff. They must also include individuals in the registry (including victims and witnesses units), chambers,
and prosecution offices with legal expertise in sexual and gender violence,
as well as expertise in trauma related to crimes of sexual violence. Such
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provisions recognize the fact that many of the victims of war crimes and
related atrocities are women, and that women jurists, prosecutors, and other
court staff bring important perspectives to the gender crimes that tribunals
should prosecute.
War crimes tribunals are designed not only to prosecute the leaders
of regimes that have engaged in mass violations of humanitarian law, but
also to serve as a model for a newly-emerging judicial system by employing
international rules for the protection of the rights of the defendant and standards of due process. They should also serve as a model of gender equality
by appointing women to serve visible roles as judges, prosecutors, and other
prominent positions. Domestic war crimes tribunals should disclose the
gender representation of each trial bench, along with other basic information
about the qualifications and experience of the judges (but not put them at
risk by disclosing their identities). The same should be disclosed with regard to the prosecution office, registry, and defense bar. Just as it is important that women serve as prominent members of government, so too should
women participate prominently in war crimes tribunals. Before and during
trials, domestic war crimes tribunals should also provide for judges, prosecutors, and other tribunal players training sessions on gender sensitivity and
dealing with sexual violence. Efforts must be made to insure that such tribunals provide an enabling environment for victims of sexual violence before and during their testimqny and keep victims of sexual violence informed about court proceedings thereafter. Prosecutors and investigating
judges must make prosecuting and investigating gender crimes a priority
from the outset.
Holding perpetrators of mass violations against women accountable
for their acts has been a slow and tortuous process. Experience has shown
that including women judges in war crimes tribunals particularly makes a
difference. Tribunals should implement creative and proactive ways of encouraging a local-populace to support war crimes trials, rather than concluding that said society is ')ust not ready for this." Outreach to women in the
diaspora should also be considered where it may be thought to be particularly difficult to enlist local women in visible roles. While gender parity and
justice is never convenient, it is a fundamental aspect for lasting and credible justice.

Lesson# 10: Domestic war crimes tribunals must make effective public
outreach a priority.
Domestic war crimes tribunals should create a public outreach office to provide regular briefings on the court and trial developments. Not
only would this ·enhance public knowledge about court proceedings, it
would impede the constant speculation, misinformation, and rumors that so
often overwhelm high-profile trials. The lliT failed to create an effective
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public outreach office. Consequently, Iraqi citizens and the international
community were essentially left to use their imaginations when judging the
tribunal's proceedings. As evidenced by the decision to televise the proceedings, the lliT was designed in part to serve an educative function. But
the procedural decisions of the lliT were usually shrouded in mystery, as
little attempt was made to clarify the many public misconceptions as they
arose during the Dujail trial. If the Iraqi people are ever going to feel ownership over the lliT proceedings and if the international community is ever
going to accept the tribunal as legitimate and fair, they need to fully understand what is going on in the courtroom, and the message should not have to
be filtered through the press.
To remedy this problem in the future, the presiding judge should
explain procedural decisions in open court, even if this is not traditionally
done in Iraqi trials. Where decisions are made in closed sessions, explanation for going into closed session should be given in open court, and a
summary of what occurred in the closed session should also be delivered in
open court after closed session. In addition, the lliT should appoint an experienced lawyer or experienced journalist with a legal background to head
the Public Outreach Office (a role eventually undertaken by the chief investigating judge Ra'id). The lliT Public Outreach Officer should issue an official statement every day of the trial (in both Arabic and, where resources
allow in, English and/or French), explaining what went on that day and answering the questions that the public and press are likely to have about the
day's proceedings. Such official press statements, together with trial exhibits, transcripts, budgets, annual reports, and other court documents, should
be posted (in both Arabic and, where resources allow, in English and/or
French) on the tribunal's website on a daily basis for worldwide viewing.
Domestic war crimes tribunals should also run public service announcements on local and international television and radio, hold town hall
meetings via the radio, the tribunal website, and where security permits
throughout the country. They should develop a media program with workshops, bringing in selected domestic and international journalists to cover
the tribunal and its trials. They should prepare, publish, and disseminate to
key stakeholders and the public a handbook titled "what you need to know
about the [domestic] war crimes tribunal." Public outreach should focus not
only on the particulars of the day to day proceedings, but also on the importance of the right to a fair trial, and the presumption of innocence until
proven guilty.

